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THOUGHTS ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION*
(FEBRUARY 23, 2007)
Ronald KL. Collins, Steven H. Shiffrin,
Erwin Chemerinsky & Kathleen M. Sullivant
RONALD K.L. COLLINS: Welcome. It's been thirty years, give or
take. It's been a long time, but it's nice to be back. Before we begin
today's program, just a couple of things. First of all, I would like to
thank a person who had a very big hand in putting this all together
with me, and that is my friend and colleague, Jim Weinstein.
Whatever the measure of success of this conference, it will be due in
large measure to Jim's insight, hard work, and real dedication; he's
just a wonderful person to work with. I'm happy to share, and be
sharing this conference with him, so again, thanks, Jim. A person
who moved mountains, many of them, to make this possible: Ellen
Aprill. I really think it's not an exaggeration to say that it could not
have happened without Ellen Aprill's dedicated and very resourceful,
and always helpful, assistance. So, a big "thank you" to her. And to
the Dean, David Burcham, who, without his assistance, without his
support, and without his real commitment to this, and to honoring
Steve Shiffrin, it would have been impossible as well, so thank you.
The year was 1976; the case was Virginia Pharmacy.1 The
United States Supreme Court rendered an opinion in what is
routinely seen as the case that heralded, at least in a full sense, the
* On February 23-24, 2007, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles held the live symposium
Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future. This transcript is from the February 23rd lunch
panel, which was moderated by Adam Liptak, National Legal Correspondent, The New York
Times. This transcript has been edited for clarity and grammar by Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review.
t Ronald K.L. Collins, Scholar, First Amendment Center, Washington, D.C.; Steven H.
Shiffrin, Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor of Law, Comell University School of Law; Erwin
Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Duke
University School of Law; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Stanley Morrison Professor of Law and Former
Dean, Stanford Law School.
1. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Commercial Speech Doctrine into the world of the First Amendment.
Of course there were other cases before that, but this was the big one.
And it's noteworthy to recall that case was argued by one of David
Vladeck's colleagues, Alan Morrison of Public Citizen. So the
Commercial Speech Doctrine is brought to us by public interest
advocates-if you will, for lack of a better word, "Nader types"-at
least at a time when it had a different connotation. Also, in that case,
there was a man named Philip Kurland, of the University of Chicago,
who submitted a brief on behalf of the Association of National
Advertisers.2  So what you had were public interest advocates
working with advertisers to promote what came to be known as the
Commercial Speech Doctrine.
By 1980, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., and it was Justice William Rehnquist
writing in dissent arguing against the First Amendment claim? And
he wrote, "The Court today returns to the bygone era of Lochner v.
New York."4 Well, there you have it, the conservative Rehnquist
writing in dissent-and whom does he draw upon to support his
position that there should be no protection for First Amendment
speech? Well, none other than the liberal C. Edwin Baker. Well,
Rehnquist, continuing in that sense, added, "Today the Court unlocks
a Pandora's Box when it elevates commercial speech to the level of
traditional political speech by according it First Amendment
protection."5 So here you see the conservative Rehnquist aided and
abetted by the scholarship of C. Edwin Baker, the liberal scholar,
leading an attack on the Commercial Speech Doctrine.'
Well, that Pandora's Box to which Rehnquist referred was open
like never before in the year 2003, in a case called Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky.7 Pandora's Box is really the right metaphor because, what do
we see? Who is representing Nike? Well, the liberal Laurence Tribe
and the liberal Walter Dellinger. And who is opposing Nike? Well,
2. Brief for Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc., Va. Pharm., 425 U.S. 748 (No. 74-895).
3. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 447 U.S. 557, 583-06 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 589 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
5. Id. at 599.
6. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REv. 1 (1976).
7. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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the liberal Alan Morrison,8 the liberal David Vladeck,9 and the liberal
Erwin Chemerinsky.'0 I mean, you have liberals on both sides. Talk
about being schizophrenic.
Well, this panel, in particular in this conference more generally,
will explore the commercial speech paradox. More specifically, we
will examine questions like the following three: To what extent does
the corporate identity of a speaker determine the level of First
Amendment protection to be afforded? And, as David Skover and I
have written in The Death of Discourse," to what extent is it possible
in our highly commercial culture to clearly demarcate commercial
speech on the one hand from political speech on the other hand?
And finally, to what extent, if any, can liberalism endorse the
commercial speech agenda without forsaking its credentials as a
progressive movement?
Today, we are fortunate to begin our discourse with four
especially knowledgeable and engaging people. Erwin Chemerinsky
is from Duke University. He's a nationally noted constitutionalist
and a Supreme Court litigator of the best ranks. So, welcome, Erwin,
and thank you for being here. Professor Kathleen Sullivan is here
from Stanford University, and like Gerald Gunther before her, she
combines thoughtful jurisprudence with a mastery of doctrine. I
think we're very fortunate to have her with us. Thank you for
participating today. As for Adam Liptak of The New York Times,
he's the legal affairs writer there. And, like Anthony Lewis before
him, he brings a wealth of knowledge and insight to his writing.
Welcome, Adam. Finally, the man of the moment, Steve Shiffrin
from Cornell, the Walt Whitman, if you will, of the legal academy.
More about Steve later. And there you have it. Shall we let the
discourse begin?
ADAM LIPTAK: I think I'm going to start the discourse by moving up
to the grown-ups table. [Laughter] Well, thank you so much for
organizing this, and for having us and for having the opportunity to
8. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Nike, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575).
9. Id.
10. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United States
Congress, Representatives Dennis J. Kucinich, et al., Nike, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL
1844684.
11. RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (2d ed.
Carolina Academic Press 2005).
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honor Steve. It's very nice for me to take a break from a for-profit,
publicly traded company's work that is nonetheless, apparently, fully
protected by the First Amendment. [Laughter] As you know, we
spend our days manufacturing consent. But, unlike some other
corporations-and we'll explore this question-we seem to have
maximum First Amendment protections. I guess I want to start the
conversation with a metaphor that Steve uses, an organizing principle
I guess, and ask the questions: Through what lens ought we look at
this question of "What is commercial speech?" Does it turn on the
identity of the speaker or the nature of the thought expressed? Steve
often starts with the image of the dissenter. How, if we organize our
First Amendment thinking around the notion that dissent is what
wants to be protected the most, does that inform our thinking about
commercial speech?
STEVEN H. SHIFFRN: First I would like to say, as I will say, I think,
several times in the conference, that I am very honored and very
grateful for those who have put this conference together. As to the
substantive issues, I have argued that the First Amendment should be
especially concerned about protecting and promoting dissent, about
protecting those who would speak out against existing customs,
habits, traditions, institutions and authorities. If one looks at
commercial speech through that lens, it seems clear to me that
commercial speech should be lower in the hierarchy of First
Amendment values than other forms of speech. I think one can also
say it should be lower in the hierarchy of First Amendment values
because of the-in the case of corporations in particular-lack of a
liberty interest of the speaker. I also think that if one has a politically
centered conception of the First Amendment, that commercial speech
should be lower in the hierarchy of First Amendment values. The
last point I would make is that this area is highly complicated, with
many different factual situations, and that there are some
circumstances in which I think, particularly in informational
advertising, that commercial speech should get a measure of First
Amendment protection.
LIPTAK: Erwin, is that the right metaphor? Is the marketplace of
ideas a competing metaphor for organizing this?
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY: I think I get to be the first speaker at the
conference to disagree with Steve Shiffrin. [Laughter] Let me start
by saying how wonderful it is to be part of this terrific conference.
As I said to David Burcham, it is great to be home and a part of
celebrating and honoring Steven Shiffrin.
I think I disagree with everything that Steve just said.
[Laughter] I certainly accept that dissent is an important part of the
First Amendment, but I don't think it's the central, and certainly not
the only, purpose of the First Amendment. The First Amendment
also protects speech that agrees with and supports the government. It
supports speech that enriches us, but has nothing to do with the
political process. Wonderful art and wonderful music may not be
about dissent, but they are still protected by the First Amendment.
And it even protects speech that degrades or debases us. I believe
that sexual speech, hate speech even, has a place in the First
Amendment.
I also disagree with his premise that it's good to have a
hierarchy of speech, saying we want the most value, a little bit less
value, and a little bit less value than that. That's why I don't like
starting with the distinction based on who the speaker is, or even
what's commercial or noncommercial speech. It seems to me that
the question is: is there a compelling reason for stopping particular
speech? And if there's not a compelling reason, then we should
allow all of the speech to go forward. The marketplace of ideas
metaphor has a lot of strengths, but I think the idea is that the First
Amendment should protect all speech unless there's a compelling
reason for stopping it.
LIPTAK: Let me follow you just a little bit, because my sense is that
you're not averse to finding that compelling interest in a whole range
of situations.
CHEMERINSKY: Not at all. But I think that's the right question. To
me the question is: is there an extraordinarily important reason for
stopping speech in a particular case? When we get to it, I'll say I
think in the Nike case" there was a reason for wanting to hold Nike
liable. But I think when you start talking about a hierarchy of speech
12. Nike, 539 U.S. at 654.
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you're really obscuring the question. And the question is: is there a
reason for stopping this speech, under these circumstances?
LIPTAK: Kathleen, where do you fit in on this spectrum?
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN: Well, I agree with the thanks to the
conference organizers, very much. [Laughter] That part we're in
total agreement about on. After that, I associate myself a bit more
with Erwin than with Steve. Let me turn the telescope around and
give an additional reason to see commercial speech as appropriately
protected by First Amendment values. And that is, fear of the
government. We fear government for speech more than markets; we
have an anti-paternalism principle for government telling us what to
think and say in a way that we don't have an anti-paternalism
principle for government telling us how many hours we can work, or
what wages we can receive, in part because we're afraid of
government manipulating ideas and engaging in thought control as a
means of serving other values. And when we tell people what they
can hear or read, or listen to or watch, we're doing it to prevent ideas
from reaching and influencing them. That has a different valence
than the direct regulation of conduct.
And so I think commercial speech does occupy the same world
as other kinds of speech when we fear government intervention to be
paternalistic, to tell us what to think, to engage in thought control, to
intervene between our thoughts and our actions. And it may be that
there are all kinds of, as Erwin says, good content-neutral reasons to
regulate speech sometimes. For example, because corporations
know a lot more than we do about the harm their product is causing,
there's been an asymmetry of information and that ought to be
corrected. But I tend to support speech-enhancing ways of
correcting those problems, like disclosure obligations, rather than
leveling down through silencing speech.
LIPTAK: Go ahead, Steve.
SHIFFRIN: A few comments. We agreed over the telephone that we
wouldn't have a debate here, but here we have three law professors,
so we'll be saying some things, I think, that might contradict what
others say. As to our fear of government, and our opposition to anti-
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paternalism, it is the case that the Securities and Exchange
Commission, when dealing with corporations, engages in
paternalism. It doesn't trust consumers to be able to make decisions
as to the buying of products without policing the market. The
Federal Trade Commission engages in paternalism. And it's, I
would say, a fixed part of our jurisprudence. The Food and Drug
Administration regulates what drug companies say. So that, when
we're talking about false statements by corporations, it just happens
to be the case that paternalism is at the center of what we do. It is
not at the margin.
Secondly, I would say with respect to Erwin saying there should
be a compelling state interest, I need to know why. We do not have
a compelling state interest for all speech. In the area of defamation,
even with respect to The New York Times, there is a balancing of
reputation and press. Sometimes The New York Times gets very
heavy protection; sometimes it does not get as much protection. If a
private person sues The New York Times in a defamation case, the
private person only has to show negligence. 3 With respect to
whether a hierarchy of speech is appropriate, it would radically
change First Amendment doctrine to say that there is not a hierarchy.
Speech is protected under the First Amendment, except when it is
not. [Laughter] And there are many categories of speech that are not
protected. And many of them are not protected because they are
considered to be lower in the hierarchy of First Amendment values
than other forms of speech.
Finally, I would like to agree with Erwin. [Laughter]
SULLIVAN: But you can't. [Laughter]
SHIFFRIN: No, I searched very hard, and I was able to find one thing I
could agree with. Which is that I believe that there is a multiplicity
of values that underlie the First Amendment. You cannot reduce it to
a single value. I do think that protecting the practice of dissent,
which I do not regard to be a value, is extremely significant. But I
agree that there is a multiplicity of values. And I think when you
look at those values, commercial speech, across the range of values,
doesn't maximize them to the same extent as other forms of speech.
13. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
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SULLIVAN: Well, I'd like to challenge the idea that commercial
speech is somehow lower value. I thought Steve was going to
suggest that commercial speech should be less protected because it
emanates from corporations, and we mistrust corporations in a way
we don't mistrust Walt Whitman, for example. But now that he's
laid the gauntlet down about value of speech, I do want to challenge
that a bit. Let's remember some things about patronage and things of
beauty. The Sistine Chapel wasn't painted from the idea of a single
artist. It was given patronage by the church. Lots of great works
were the result of financial sponsorship. And, indeed, The New York
Times is one of them. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, to which you
just alluded, was about an advertisement.14 That's what created the
special First Amendment protections against libel. It was not the
editorial department. It was not the news department. It was not the
brilliant legal commentary of Adam Liptak, which would never need
First Amendment protection because it's already perfect. [Laughter]
But it was about an advertisement. And, in fact, advertisement is
what sells The New York Times. It's what sells broadcast. Of course,
we're in a new world where we had an Internet for a while that
wasn't advertisement-driven but now increasingly is. So, let's think
about commercial speech as sort of continuous with, and perhaps
indispensable to, the flow of speech in the rest of society.
Second, commercial speech may be of value to people. When
Public Citizen litigated Virginia Board,15 it was making the point that
true drug prices may be more important to a pensioner than any latest
information about the Libby trial 6 or other national news like the
Anna Nicole Smith trial.17 And the slogan of the first Clinton
campaign in The War Room was "it's the economy, stupid." 8 So the
notion that economic decisions are not important to people, that
14. Id.
15. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
16. United States v. Libby, 495 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding the President's
commutation of former vice presidential advisor Scooter Libby's prison sentence did not affect
his probation); United States v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that there were
not substantial questions of law or fact sufficient to warrant the release of defendant Scooter
Libby pending his appeal).
17. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (holding that the federal bankruptcy claims of
Anna Nicole Smith were not precluded by the decisions of a state probate court).
18. THE WAR ROOM (McEttinger Films 1994).
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commercial speech is less valuable, ignores both the institutional role
of advertising in keeping the whole rest of the free speech system
going, and the individual value to listeners that commercial ads can
have. And after all, Walt Whitman has been mentioned, and his
contemporary John Stuart Mill said it is not for government to decide
that poetry is better than pushpin. And it is not necessarily consistent
with the relativism you would impose upon speech for political
purposes to say that we can decide: "Well, commercial speech, that's
not of high value." So I'm all with you on harms, but I'm not with
you on the valuation of speech that puts commercial speech lower
than other forms of speech. Advertising may be a kind of late
twentieth-century art form in its own self.
LIPTAK: Maybe we can pause for a moment and make sure we're
talking about the same thing. We're talking about commercial
speech, but I'm not sure each of us has the same idea of what it is
we're talking about when we talk about commercial speech. I don't
know that most people would think that the civil rights advertisement
that was at the root of the Times against Sullivan was commercial
speech in the sense of proposing or advocating a commercial
transaction." Is that all we're talking about? Or are we talking about
any sort of speech that a corporation makes? Are we talking about
any speech about economic matters? Are we talking in Nike v.
Kasky, ° about only pro-Nike practice speech but not critical of Nike
practice speech? Maybe I could ask each of you to sketch out what it
is that we're talking about when we use the phrase "commercial
speech."
CHEMERINSKY: The Supreme Court, only once, has attempted a
definition of commercial speech, as in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp.2 There the court said three factors together were
enough to make it commercial speech. They said first, "Is it an
advertisement?" Second, "Does it concern a product?" And third,
"Does it stem from economic motivation?"22 Now I don't think
that's exhaustive of everything that's commercial speech, but I think
19. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 274.
20. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
21. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
22. Id. at 66-67.
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it's a good starting point for commercial speech. I would certainly
reject that it's commercial speech just because it comes from a
corporation. Obviously, every newspaper and every magazine,
including its editorial content, is coming from a corporation. Every
book is likely published by a corporation. So that can't be it. Now,
as with any line-drawing, there are going to be hard cases. And we
could talk about the ads that Nike took out. Or, what about the ads
that Mobil Oil takes out on the editorial pages of The New York
Times? And so on. But I think Bolger at least gives us starting point
in defining the phrase "commercial speech."
LIPTAK: Do we accept that premise that that's what we're talking
about?
SULLIVAN: I will sell you X good or service for Y price is the limit of
the definition. I would not extend it to non-advertising speech by
corporations or any speech that's motivated principally by patronage
or sponsorship or financial gain because that would cover far too
much. Every book published by a for-profit publisher is motivated
by commercial gain. So it's got to be the narrow definition Erwin
describes.
SHIFFRIN: As I said earlier, I think there are many problems. I would
start with the point that I think we would all agree on, that media
speech is not-with narrow exceptions--commercial speech. Why
do we distinguish business corporations from media corporations?
Ed Baker, I think, got it right, when he said that the product of the
press is the speech; unlike Virginia Pharmacy, where the product is
drugs. 3 A second factor is that the press has a checking function to
perform, and it seems to me, gets protection because of that. I think
there's a difference between informational advertising that is true
and between false advertising which receives no protection.
I think this whole topic is much broader than proposing a
commercial transaction. That is simply focusing essentially on
commercial advertising. The larger question we are facing is how
we deal with corporate speech in general. Corporate speech is
outlawed in some contexts. For example, corporations generally
23. 425 U.S. at 748.
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can't even engage in corporate expenditures with respect to political
campaigns, which is centrally protected speech. The New York
Times can, however, for the reasons that I discussed.
Two other comments: Kathleen mentions how important it is for
consumers to be able to know what drug prices are. I think that,
although it was the main case before the Supreme Court, is a
somewhat atypical example. I'll give one at the other end of the
spectrum, which is drawn from 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island.24 Instead of calling up the image of the aged person who
needs drugs in order to survive, we get the image of the alcoholic
looking for the cheapest bottle of jug wine.
SULLIVAN: It was vodka. [Laughter]
SHIFFRrN: If there's a First Amendment difference there, I do not spy
it. [Laughter] But I would say again, that if there's a range of First
Amendment values, commercial speech, it seems to me, doesn't
have, for example, the sort of speaker liberty other forms of
protected speech have. As to John Stuart Mill, John Stuart Mill did
not think commercial speech should be protected; nor did the United
States protect commercial speech until Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy.25 And somehow we thought we had a democracy.
CHEMERINSKY: I again want to disagree with some of what Steve
said.
SHIFFRIN: I'm shocked. [Laughter]
LIPTAK: You don't have to preface it each time. [Laughter]
CHEMERINSKY: First, I'm very skeptical of trying to draw
distinctions among corporate entities, saying a media corporation is
treated differently from a non-media corporation. When you think of
something like Time Warner and all that it holds, I wonder whether
it's a media or non-media corporation. I start wondering, what if a
media corporation is engaging in advertising to consume more of its
24. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
25. 425 U.S. at 748.
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product? Is it then functioning as a media or non-media company?
Lest you think this is a hypothetical, just watch any TV station and
how many of its ads are about watching more programs on that TV
station. Or I remember the huge controversy here in Los Angeles
about an insert to the Los Angeles Times when Staples Center was
about to open.26 Is it functioning as a media company or not a media
company there?
The second thing that I think is a lot of what Steve says is about
the situations where there may be a compelling interest in restricting
corporate speech. I believe there is a compelling interest in stopping
corporate campaign contributions. It's not because it's not speech;
it's not because it's commercial speech; it's because that's a place
where there is a compelling interest. I certainly believe that false
advertising should be prohibited. Not because it's not speech, but to
me, that's because there is a compelling interest. Now we can
disagree whether that's a compelling interest. But to me, that's the
appropriate question.
Finally, as to the Liquormart example, I don't think it achieves
what Steve wants it to.27 I think for some individuals, being able to
purchase alcohol with a limited budget may be very important to
their happiness. Now we may not make those choices in our own
lives, or respect their choice much, but it's tremendously
paternalistic that because we don't care as much about cheap vodka,
it's not important in somebody else's life. So I think that it does
show exactly what Kathleen was saying, which is what Justice
Blackmun said, that commercial speech can be very important in a
person's life, and that's why it is something where there should be a
compelling interest test used.
SHIFFRIN: I would say that a good example that one might focus on
to determine whether one should have intermediate scrutiny with
respect to informational advertising or a form of strict scrutiny which
Erwin is sort of flirting with-he has a different, not the usual
conception of compelling state interest-would be tobacco
advertising. Four hundred thousand people die every year because
26. See David Shaw, A Business Deal Done-A Controversy Born for the Record, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, Special Section, Part V, at 1.
27. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 484.
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they smoke tobacco. Tobacco advertising reaches children, and there
are brand favorites among children with respect to cigarettes. Should
we have a compelling state interest test with respect to that? As to
the difference between political and commercial speech, of course
there are line-drawing problems, but that doesn't mean you don't
make the distinction. The Federal Trade Commission has to make a
distinction between commercial speech and non-commercial speech.
And it has to be able to distinguish between media advertising that
counts as commercial speech and that which doesn't.
LIPTAK: Let's talk about cigarettes for a second, because it's such a
hard case. Ought the government be able to regulate truthful
advertising about a lawful product?
SULLIVAN: No. And in fact, tobacco is a great illustration of the
point that even for commercial speech, more speech, good counsel,
will drive out evil. There's no clearer example of more speech
driving out pernicious advertising than tobacco. If you all recall,
there was once tobacco advertising on television. What eliminated it
was the fact that right of reply and equal time requirements,
administered by the then-FCC, permitted the American Cancer
Society, the American Lung Society, and other groups to put on
counter-advertisements, where you would see on one ad: this is the
Marlboro Man, he looks pretty cool on his horse and in his boots and
spurs. And then the American Cancer Society would you show you:
this is the Marlboro Man's lungs. Well, it didn't take many of those
ads to lead tobacco, voluntarily, to remove tobacco advertising on
TV because it couldn't do battle with counter advertising that
showed negative health effects. So where government has not only
the power to permit commercial speech, but also the power to
provide, through its own advertising, contrary messages, there cannot
be control of speech. That's one point.
Two is that if government wants to regulate the underlying
activity, it should do so directly, by prohibiting the activity; limiting
the activity; enforcing the activity as engaged in by minors; by taxing
the heck out of the activity, instead of entering into a sweetheart deal
with the tobacco companies that enables them, through the state
settlement, to make twice as much money as they need to pay the
state tax. In other words, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas are
Fall 2007]
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surely right in 44 Liquormart, Inc. that the state always has a direct
alternative to engaging in paternalism through taxation, prohibition,
and counter-propaganda.28 And under those circum-stances it's very
difficult to see why the state should be able to prohibit, or limit, the
truthful advertisement of a legal product.
SHIFFRIN: It's not difficult for me to see why.
SULLIVAN: Because you're an old-fashioned paternalist. [Laughter]
SHIFFRIN: Yes, I am. [Laughter]
SHIFFRIN: I believe that when 400,000 people die every year, taking
efforts to prevent that from happening, if called paternalism, is a
good thing. And I agree that there are measures that can be taken.
Increased taxes could lead to black markets. Outlawing tobacco
surely would lead to black markets. It is true that counter speech is
effective; it would be more effective to have counter speech and to
outlaw tobacco advertising. It seems to me that maximum efforts to
protect public health would be desirable, and I would argue that it
would also meet Erwin's compelling state interest test.
CHEMERINSKY: Good question. I'm going to come down with
Kathleen, though, for a different reason. I think when you go strict
scrutiny it's not only, "Do you have compelling interest?," but "Is
this necessary to achieve it?" Nobody is less sympathetic to the
tobacco companies than I am, having had a father who died of lung
cancer and who became a smoker at a very young age. I very much
would love to see anything to put the tobacco companies out of
business, but I also believe the First Amendment protects their right
to advertise. I agree with Steve that there's a compelling interest.
The question is: is banning ads necessary to achieve it? Well, first, I
don't think the evidence shows that banning ads really will stop
children from smoking. Second, I believe that counter-speech is
more likely to be effective. Also, neither Kathleen nor Steve talked
about a slippery slope argument that I'm concerned about. If we can
say we can ban tobacco ads because smoking is bad, and we can ban,
28. Id. at 530-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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say, liquor ads because drinking can be abused, can we ban ads for
fast food because they might be high in trans fats? Can we ban ads
for products like potato chips that have a lot of salt because that
increases blood pressure? I'm not sure where the stopping point is if
we're saying that this is really necessary to achieve a compelling
interest. And so, again, I think that if you could show me this would
work and no other alternative would work, then I'm with you Steve,
but I don't think the evidence is there.
SHIFFRIN: Two hundred and sixty-five billion dollars are spent on
advertising. That, it seems to me, contributes to exactly the kind of
citizens who are materialistic, hedonistic, not much caring to
participate in politics, and the value of commercial speech, it seems
to me, is problematic. Would all children not engage in smoking?
No, of course not. Would there be advantages in banning cigarette
advertising? Cigarette companies advertise because they believe that
it is going to help their product. It's not just a matter of brand
switching. And the slippery slope: some of the examples that Erwin
gave are examples that are directed to children. And I don't see a
good argument for protecting companies who advertise to children
with respect to such products. Beyond that, I think corporate power
is significantly strong enough in this country that one need not worry
that a whole lot of products are not going to be able to advertise, and
if it did happen I don't see the harm.
LIPTAK: What's lurking behind some of these arguments, I think, is
the sense that corporations are terribly powerful, and simply the
volume and amount of the speech that they can put out is going to
overwhelm the counter-arguments. And that people, having heard
one point ten times and the other point only once, will tend to think
that the point they heard ten times is correct. And I'm not sure how
to think about that. But I do think that that's part of what people who
are pro-regulation are afraid of. Kathleen, how does that jibe with
your anti-paternalistic thinking?
SULLIVAN: Well, I tend to be a strong supporter of the notion of
corporate free speech, in part because I don't start from an
individualistic, romantic dissent notion of freedom of speech with
exclusively. I think Steve Shiffrin's book is a wonderful
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contribution to the dialogue-to the discourse-on First Amendment
values with respect to that value. But I think the First Amendment
protects other values beyond dissent, and I agree with Erwin on that
point. One of the things that it protects is simply a system of free
flow of information that's essentially determined through private
interactions, in which the underlying markets are regulated, but we
generally try to assume that the ideas are not. Now, I'm not saying
that you can't combat the evils that Steve described. I'm just saying
that you should lexically prioritize regulation of conduct through
prohibition and taxation over regulation of speech. That should be
an extreme last resort. And I don't think we're anywhere near a
demonstration of such governmental, systematic efforts to prevent
children from smoking, and appropriate tax measures, that we're at
the point of last resort. So I basically support corporate freedom of
speech to contribute to the system and flow of free information.
That's a systemic and a holistic approach, rather than an
individualistic and dissenter's approach. I think the principal answer
is, really, corporate speech should be presumptively protected unless
and until the particular harms you suggest are manifested.
LIPTAK: Let's talk about the Nike, Inc.29 case for a second; the great
missed opportunity to bring some coherence to this area. Having
heard what Erwin said so far, I would not necessarily, knowing only
that, have predicted that he would turn up on the anti-Nike side of
that decision. Erwin, why don't you sketch out for us a tiny bit about
the case, and then your thinking about it?
CHEMERINSKY: Sure. Hopefully everybody is already familiar with
it. Nike was accused of using sweatshop labor in foreign countries,
and it then decided to respond.3" It responded in part by taking out
ads in major newspapers denying that it used sweatshop labor. It
also sent letters to university presidents; it organized some op-ed
pieces.3  Kasky is a resident here in California. He sued under
California law. He sued Nike for damages. He said that Nike was
engaged in false commercial advertising. 2 Basically, Kasky argued
29. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).




that Nike was engaged in unfair business practices in the terms of the
California statute. Nike moved to dismiss on First Amendment
grounds. The superior court sided with Nike.33 The California Court
of Appeal sided with Nike. 4 But the California Supreme Court
reversed. 5 The California Supreme Court said what Nike was
engaged in was commercial speech. 6 The Supreme Court has long
said that false commercial speech is not protected by the First
Amendment. The California Supreme Court remanded the case back
to the superior court for a trial as to whether Kasky's allegations in
his complaint were true.37 Remember all of this was essentially on a
demurrer. It was Nike moving to dismiss the case.
The United States Supreme Court granted Nike's petition for
review.38 It was briefed and argued in the Supreme Court. Then on
the very last day of the 2003 term, I think to everybody's surprise,
the Supreme Court dismissed the case-cert had been improvidently
granted.39 Justice Stevens wrote an opinion suggesting that Kasky
didn't meet the Article III requirements for standing.4" Also, there
wasn't a final judgment in the case. So the underlying issue
remained unresolved. That's the quick sketch of the case.
In terms of why I chose to write a brief on the Kasky side, on
behalf of members of Congress, I do believe that there's a
compelling government interest in stopping false commercial
speech.4 I think Nike was very much engaged in commercial
speech. It was trying to sell a particular product. It met that Bolger
test that I mentioned.42 Think of it this way: Should a tuna company
be able to falsely say that it uses only dolphin safe tuna? Should a
cosmetic company be able to falsely say that it doesn't test its
product on animals? Should a lettuce company be able to falsely say
that it's selling you only organic lettuce? Should a poultry company
33. Id.
34. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Ct. App. 2000).
35. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
36. Id. at 258.
37. id. at 262.
38. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099, 1099 (2003).
39. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 654 (2003).
40. Id. at661-63.
41. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Member of the United States
Congress, Representatives Dennis J. Kucinich, et al., Nike, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575).
42. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
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be able to falsely say that it only slaughters chicken in a kosher
manner? To me, had the Nike side won, then there'd be no way to
stop all of those false claims that are enormously important to
consumers. California has a law that says that a company can't
falsely say that it's union-made.43 A company can't falsely say that
its goods are made by the blind.' What we were trying to do is to
protect the ability of the government to have exactly those kinds of
laws.
SULLIVAN: But what Nike was saying went far beyond a simple
branding of a product as union-made. These were long, infomercial-
type advertisements which covered the topics of sweatshops, covered
the topics of labor standards, covered topics in discursive prose that
went far beyond a simple advertisement. It may have been directed,
ultimately, at saving the company's profits, but it wasn't just a
commercial claim about a commercial sale. It was a broader claim
about corporate behavior that is part of a dialogue on human rights
standards and whether or not the United States can insist upon
exporting the same standards through American companies abroad,
as it imposes at home. That's a part of a broader political debate. It
can't be the case that you can allow Nike to be falsely accused by
people of doing things it hasn't done without giving it a chance to
fight back. That violates Marquess of Queensberry rules. 5 It puts
one hand behind the corporation's back. And there is one way to
answer. Erwin says there would be no way to stop the company
from making these false claims. There is a way. Run an ad or file an
investigative reporting story that shows it to be false. There are
many ways consistent with freedom of speech that are possible, just
not possible through government fiat.
LIPTAK: Think about it from my simple-minded reporter's
perspective. This issue is in the news-whether Nike is operating
43. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1012 (West 2003).
44. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17522 (West 1997).
45. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating on free speech grounds
a law banning symbols of racial hatred). The Court stated, "St. Paul has no such authority to
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules." Id. at 392; see also Ross Rosen, Perspective: In the Aftermath of McClellan:
Isn't it Time for the Sport of Boxing to Protect its Participants?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 611,
613-14 (1995) (discussing the Marquess of Queensberry rules).
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sweatshops abroad is in the news. I call on Mr. Kasky and he can
say anything he wants, short of defamation. I call up the chairman of
Nike and, under the rule Erwin is proposing, he's profoundly chilled.
CHEMERINSKY: The rule that I'm saying is that factual statements by
a manufacturer, with the intent of increasing sales, should be defined
as commercial speech. I don't think it depends on whether it's in
prose or how long it is, because if a company wants to take out a
long ad saying, "we don't use animals for testing our cosmetics," and
they write it as a long paragraph, and it's false, and it's about
increasing sales, I think that that's still commercial speech. There's
a difference between an ad, which is what Nike was taking out, and
talking to you, Adam, as a reporter. In terms of the last thing
Kathleen said-because I think this is really important-she says,
"well, there's other ways to be able to stop this. Take out your ad
yourself." How are others going to know whether or not Nike is
using sweatshops? You can't go there. How are you going to know
whether the cosmetics company is really testing on animals or not?
How are you going to know whether the tuna company is really
catching tuna in a dolphin-safe way? The company that's engaged in
that speech has knowledge that competitors can't have, and
consumers can't have. That's why we need the government to be
regulating false commercial speech.
SHIFFRIN: I have a slightly different take on this. I agree that the fact
that there are other ways should not decide this, just as I think with
respect to liquor. By the way, the favorite ad of eight-year-olds is
Budweiser. But just as with respect to liquor and tobacco, that there
are alternatives, I do not believe that the perfect should be the enemy
of the good. With respect to this, if the Securities and Exchange
Commission were regulating the very same statements made by Nike
as, for example, in a registration statement, the statements would be
subject to strict liability. They would not be protected. Despite the
fact that it strikes me that the statements are both commercial and
political, it is not the case that these statements were put forward as a
part of a dialogue about what humane standards around the world
should be. Nike was describing what it was doing. It is true that
those people who are interested in humane standards around the
world could look at the statements and say, "Oh, that's relevant to
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the question." But it is, as Erwin said, put forward in order to sell its
products.
Now the interesting question for me is this: the Securities and
Exchange Commission could surely regulate this if it were part of a
registration statement and use strict liability. Should Kasky have to
show negligence in order to recover? Can strict liability apply here?
And what difference does it make that you have a private plaintiff or
attorney general as opposed to an administrative agency? It seems to
me that there is a legitimate concern that a lot of plaintiffs could
bring actions against Nike that could have a chilling effect on its
speech. But it's not in the record in the Nike case. The statute has
been on the books for more than seventy years. And it seems to me,
therefore, that before that record is built, I would 'say that strict
liability would be appropriate for private attorney generals bringing
an action under that statute.
SULLIVAN: If you live in Erwin's and Steve's world, you're going to
relegate to commercial speech not only false statements of fact by a
corporation, but anything that could be construed as misleading
because the big difference between commercial speech and other
speech is not the regulation of falsity. There are other ways to go
after falsities through ordinary fraud statues as long as there's intent.
The big difference is that consumer protection laws can go after
things denominated commercial speech for mere misleadingness.
We don't do that for political speech. Recall Brown v. Hartlage.46
You can't sue the governor for fraud when he says in the election
campaign, "I won't take a salary if you elect me," and then he does.
There isn't enough prison space for misleading statements in
political campaigns to be prosecuted as fraud. So Erwin and Steve
are loading the dice here by implying that there is any finding of
falsity as to what Nike said, which there isn't because it was
dismissed on the pleadings, as Erwin said. So everyone's assuming
the conclusion here about false statements of fact. But you're also
underselling your position. You would remove from constitutional
protection statements by corporate officers that could be construed as
misleading, which is pretty much every quarter's analyst call that
could be subjected to a misleadingness standard. And that's not what
46. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
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the SEC does, but under your First Amendment world it could. And
surely that would chill speech and dry it up and leave the consumers
knowing less about how the company did that quarter than in the
world in which that is presumptively protected and commercial
speech strict liability is limited to advertising understood as a
statement: "Buy my product, X services, X goods, for Y price."
SHIFFRIN: Kathleen, I'm proud to say, and I hope I'm right, that you
live in the same world that Erwin and I do. [Laughter]
SULLIVAN: This only happened to me when I moved to California.
[Laughter]
SHIFFRIN: And I believe that that world, and probably everyone on
this panel, knows more about the FTC than I do, but I believe the
FTC is able to enforce actions against deceptive and misleading
statements. Now it may be that you think that part of the FTC
jurisdiction should be eliminated, but it is a part of our world.
SULLIVAN: No, I'm saying that to the extent that jurisdiction exists it
applies to speech that's not presumptively protected, and you're
broadening the realm of speech that's not presumptively protected.
The FTC regulates advertising and brand labels that are false and
misleading. It compels a lot of speech to avoid false and misleading
impressions. And that's all different from the normal First
Amendment world, but it applies to consumer sales. You're
suggesting, I think, that regulation may apply to anything a
corporation says, going far beyond the label on its product, the
advertising for the sale of its product, anything the corporation says
that's designed to increase sales-which is pretty much anything a
corporation ever says, since even the nonprofit activities of a
corporation are designed to create brand loyalty and consumer
goodwill and increase sales. Very few corporations are sponsoring
the Mobil Masterpiece Theater or the opera broadcast because they
love opera. They're doing it to create good name recognition. So
your definition "any speech that is engaged in to increase
commercial sales" is too broad because it's all corporate speech.
Now let's give the other side its due. You might say,
"Corporate speech is different because corporate speech is not a
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public good. We protect political speech because it's a public good.
When somebody says it, it's out there to be borrowed by anybody,
whereas corporations can internalize the benefits of advertising."
This is the Posner argument against protecting commercial speech.
But I don't think that's what you're saying. You're saying that this
speech is of lesser value because it's a corporate speaker and
corporations are dangerous. And I don't agree with that. And I
don't think you've defined a line that's enforceable.
SHIFFRIN: One quick point, and then Erwin can have lots of time.
The kinds of statements that Kathleen is worried about have to be
included in registration statements with the SEC, even if they have
enormous political significance. And when they are included, if they
are false, they are subject to strict liability. So I think it's already a
part of our discourse. That's why I think the question is the SEC
versus the private attorney general.
CHEMERINSKY: Kathleen, I think what you did was misstate my
position and then attack the misstatement. Let me go back to what I
said. I said that factual statements by a manufacturer to increase its
sales are commercial speech. I didn't say anything by a corporation
is commercial speech. At the outset I rejected the corporate/non-
corporate distinction. Now with regard to Nike Inc., I actually think
it's an easy case that it's commercial speech. And I go back to the
definition that Adam asked me for at the beginning, I evoked Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.47 Is it an advertisement? And let's
at least focus on the ads that Nike took out saying it didn't use
sweatshop labor. Does it concern particular products? Nike was
trying to sell very identifiable products. And third, does the speaker
have an economic motivation? From that definition, what Nike was
doing was commercial speech. Now you're absolutely right that
there never was a trial in Nike, Inc. But as you know, in any
demurrer or motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint are
taken as true. Kasky alleged that Nike was intentionally engaging in
false statements to increase the sale of the products. I believe that if
so, it's not protected. Finally, to the Securities and Exchange
example that we're talking about: I think that there is a compelling
47. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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interest in protecting investors, in making sure that they have
accurate information. The Securities and Exchange Commission can
punish false statements in registration documents because there is
such an important government interest at stake.
LIPTAK: I'm going to ask the audience to collect its thoughts,
collective thoughts or individual thoughts, and ask some questions in
just a moment. But let me ask one final question myself, anticipating
something in a really interesting keynote address that Professor
Redish is going to give tomorrow: Why is not the rule that both
Steve and Erwin are sketching out in the Nike case a form of
viewpoint discrimination? And if it is, should we care? Anyone?
SHIFFRIN: I'm responding to Professor Redish tomorrow, so I might
just wait to do that. [Laughter]
LIPTAK: I say that only because, having read the statement-
SHIFFRIN: It's a very good paper.
LIPTAK: It's a very powerful thought that assuming, as most of us do,
that viewpoint discrimination is the pernicious structural problem
that First Amendment law means to avoid, if you take the two sides
and only prohibit the corporation from talking about these things, but
not the critic or dissenter, you've really rearranged First Amendment
jurisprudence. But perhaps we'll leave this point for another time.
SHIFFRMN: Well, I guess I can't resist. [Laughter] It is often written
that viewpoint discrimination is never permitted. This is what
Easterbrook said in the Hudnut case.48 In the meantime, obscenity is
not protected. And what is an appeal to a prurient interest? Appeals
to good old-fashioned, healthy sexual interests are protected. But if
it's morbid and shameful, that's not protected. Works of serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value are protected. Judges are
licensed to determine what's of serious literary, artistic, political and
scientific value. The fair use provision distinguishes between some
types of speech and other types of speech as being more valuable
48. Am. Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
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than others. That implements a form of point of view discrimination.
I think if you look at the exceptions to First Amendment protection,
they are riddled with point of view discrimination, so the doctrine is:
"We will prevent point of view discrimination, except when we
won't, and then we'll call it an exception to First Amendment
protection."
CHEMERINSKY: I want to agree with Steve.
SHIFFRIN: I'm shocked.
CHEMERINSKY: I'm agreeing. I'm agreeing.
LIPTAK: What a lovely thing.
CHEMERINSKY: I also think it's important-even if you use the label
that it's viewpoint discrimination-we still have to recognize that
there is a compelling government interest in stopping classic false
advertising. Listerine saying, "We kill cold germs." Consumers
can't do the study themselves to know whether Listerine really kills
cold germs. There may not be a competitor out there, or the
competitor may want to benefit from the false advertising, so it
doesn't want to expose that it's false. We need to protect consumers.
Now this is one example, but we can go through the whole range of
instances where consumers lose, and can even be injured, by false
commercial speech. Now we can talk about whether we think that
what Nike did was false commercial speech or not, but my point is
that even if you regard it as viewpoint discrimination, there's still a
compelling interest in stopping false advertising.
LIPTAK: But when consumer reports does a study on Listerine, it's
subject not to strict liability but almost certainly to an actual malice
rule. Yet, Listerine itself has a completely different falsity standard
applied to it.
CHEMERINSKY: That's true because Listerine is engaging in it to sell
a product. And I think that we, as a society, have a compelling
interest in stopping manufacturers and businesses from engaging in
false advertising to sell their products. There is a compelling interest
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in protecting consumers from the harms they might suffer, including
the waste of money if there isn't that kind of protection. That's why
the Supreme Court, starting with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
has always said false advertising isn't protected by the First
Amendment.49
[End of Discussion]
49. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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